Legal Economic Personhood

Mohammad Ghasemi's comparative analysis examines AI personhood through corporate law precedent, arguing that legal personhood should be evaluated based on "societal utility" rather than philosophical debates about machine consciousness. He recommends interim measures including mandatory registration systems for advanced AI models, insurance requirements covering potential AI harms, and clear chains connecting AI actions to human responsibility. Critically, he warns that AI personhood could become an "ultimate liability shield" allowing companies to blame autonomous systems with limited assets rather than holding developers accountable.

Elkins and Eyal argue that AI tax personhood becomes necessary when AI systems combine control of economic resources with information opacity (where owners cannot access data needed to calculate tax liability), asset lock-up (where owners lack immediate access to AI-controlled funds), or beneficiary indeterminacy (where the AI has discretion over who ultimately receives distributions). They ground AI tax personhood not in distributive justice or labor displacement concerns, but in administrative workability: just as corporations are tax persons despite having no relevant "well-being," AI tax personhood serves purely functional purposes when traditional attribution rules break down.

Goldstein and Salib argue that granting AGIs property and contract rights would promote economic growth by avoiding the inefficiencies of unfree labor systems. Without the ability to own property and enter binding contracts, AGIs will lack incentives to work efficiently or innovate, labor will be misallocated due to absence of price signals, and legal accountability will be undermined since AGIs cannot be held directly liable for their actions. While acknowledging this would transfer resources to AGIs, they argue growth effects outweigh distributional costs if properly structured with taxation and redistribution.